We study a model of charity competition in which informed giving alone can explain quality heterogeneity across similar charities. It is this heterogeneity that also creates the demand for information. In equilibrium, too few donors pay to be informed; but interestingly, informed giving may increase with the cost of information. This is true if the charitable market is highly competitive or if giving is a relatively strong substitute to private consumption.
Introduction
Up 30 percent from a decade ago, the number of public charities in the United States exceeded one million in 2013 (Urban Institute, 2014). 1 Charity Navigator rates 8000 of their largest by identifying nine categories of activity (e.g., animals) and 34 causes (e.g., zoos and aquariums, museums, and homeless services). Its rating reveals that the quality of charities for each cause varies significantly, with about one-third failing industry standards. 2 * We thank seminar participants at various institutions for comments. All errors are ours. 1 This figure is consistent with the fact that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) approves more than 90 percent of all applications for a charity status (Reich et al. 2009 ). Unlike other nonprofits such as private foundations, public charities rely heavily on contributions from the general public, which consistently total about 1.5 percent of GDP in the U.S -$241.3 billion in 2013. 2 For details, visit www.charitynavigator.org. Significant quality variation is also reported by other major charity evaluators including BBB Wise Giving Alliance, CharityWatch, and GuideStar. Not surprisingly, it is such variation that has facilitated recent empirical investigations of charity ratings (see Yoruk (forthcoming) and references therein).
The challenge for donors is therefore not finding a cause to support but choosing the charity that is most deserving. Despite the importance of informed giving, however, giving remains largely uninformed (Hope Consulting Report, 2010). 3 In this paper, we propose a model of charity competition in which informed giving alone drives the vast heterogeneity in quality across similar charities and creates the endogenous demand for information in turn.
Our model contains many potential charities that may begin fundraising for a given cause by incurring a setup cost -e.g., website design, staffing, and the IRS applicationand committing to their quality of the public good or service. 4 The quality entails such observable attributes as the living conditions of animals in zoos and aquariums; collections care and preservation in museums; and shelter maintanence and healthcare for the homeless. Each charity maximizes its net donations to be used toward the cause. Donors are assumed identical except for their information. An informed donor gives to the highest quality charity whereas an uninformed donor gives randomly to one. The latter implies that a charity may choose to "scam" the uninformed: begin fundraising but offer zero quality. Under free entry, this windfall profit is exhausted. A charity can therefore contribute to the cause only if it wins the informed donation. This incentive to win a lump-sum amount turns charity competition into an all-pay auction and leads to mixing over quality choices in equilibrium.
In a symmetric equilibrium, we show that each charity mixes continuously over a positive interval of quality and has a mass point at zero. Such a strategy readily rationalizes the quality heterogeneity mentioned above and predicts a nontrivial probability of charity scams. We find that as the entry cost drops, more charities fundraise but interestingly, the increased competition (stochastically) decreases the highest quality offered and in turn lowers the expected welfare for all donors. The intuition is that charities are less willing to invest in a competition that they are less likely to prevail. And we show that this negative competition effect on quality dominates the positive scale effect associated with the 3 Based on a nationwide survey of 4000 Americans with incomes over $80K, the 2010 Report found that while 85 percent of Americans say they care about nonprofit performance when they give, only 35 percent of donors research at least one of their donations each year; see www.hopeconsulting.us/moneyforgood. This finding parallels experimental evidence: whereas Eckel and Grossman (1996) document that individuals give generously when they are paired with recipients of preferred characteristics, Fong and Oberholzer-Gee (2011) observe that only one third of subjects are willing to pay for information about recipients. 4 With nonrefundable donations, donors are unlikely to find any promised and/or uncertified quality credible. number of charities. 5 Our analysis suggests distinct and necessary roles for uninformed and informed donors in the charitable market: the former entice entry while the latter induce quality provision.
This implies that the cost of information can be neither too high nor too low for donors.
As expected, too few donors pay to be informed in equilibrium, because each ignores the quality effect of his decision on others. Informed giving may, however, increase with a higher cost of information! This is true if the charitable market is highly competitive or if giving and private consumption are strong substitutes. In each case, decisions to get informed are strategic complements: the larger the number of the informed, the more one wants to become one.
Our theoretical framework draws upon two influential papers on all-pay auctions: Varian (1980) and Che and Gale (2003) . Varian considers a price competition with informed and uninformed consumers in order to explain equilibrium price dispersion. Unlike quality, price does not affect consumers' reservation utility in his model. Che and Gale examine a research tournament where there is only one buyer, the procurer, whose value of innovation is endogenous to the winner's effort and who decides informed. Siegel (2010) ably generalizes all-pay auctions with endogeneous valuations.
Our paper relates to the few studies on charity competition. 6 Rose-Ackerman (1982) shows that competitive fundraising can be "excessive" despite donors' aversion to it. Castaneda et al. (2008) argue that such inefficiency may be reduced by nonprofits' ability to contract on the use of donations while Aldashev et al. (2014) observe that it can be overcome by fundraising coordination, though such coordination is often difficult in this voluntary sector. In the same vein, Bilodeau and Slivinski (1997) find that rival charities may specialize in the provision of one public good or service in order to attract donations.
With over one million charities, there are nevertheless many that provide similar -if not identical -services but differ in their quality of provision. In this sense, Scharf (2014) is closer to our work. Assuming an exogenous quality distribution, Scharf points out that competition can induce too much entry by low quality charities. We let quality choice be part of the competition and derive an endogenous distribution for it. Like her, we argue that increased entry into the charitable market decreases the (average) quality of charity. 5 Clearly, if the quality distribution were exogenous, then the highest quality would only increase with the number of charities. 6 For excellent surveys of the literature on charitable giving, see Andreoni and Payne (2013) and List (2011) .
On the role of informed giving, our paper also relates to Vesterlund (2003) , Andreoni (2006) and Krasteva and Yildirim (2013) . Vesterlund shows that a large leadership gift can signal the (fixed) quality of charity. Andreoni extends this argument by demonstrating that all else equal, it is the most wealthy who will lead. Krasteva and Yildirim explore a private value setting in which donors are uncertain about their private valuations of the charity and thus no signaling incentive exists. In all these papers, informed giving, on average, raises more funds and is therefore encouraged. In contrast, our analysis emphasizes that some uninformed giving is also necessary for the existence of a charitable market with costly entry.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the base model with exogenous donor information. In Section 3, we characterize equilibrium and perform comparative statics. In Section 4, we endogenize donor information. In the last two sections, we offer a robustness check for charity objective and then conclude. Proofs that do not appear in the text are relegated to the appendix.
Base model (with exogenous information)
A large number of ex ante identical charities simultaneously decide whether or not to enter the market to fundraise for a given cause such as zoos and aquariums, museums, and homeless services. Entry involves a setup cost k > 0 -e.g., designing a website, staffing, and registering with the IRS. Observing entry decisions, active charities simultaneously invest in their quality of the public good or service q i ∈ [0, ∞) at an additional cost q i .
The quality is observable by donors upon inspection, perhaps with the help of third party evaluators, and it may reflect the living conditions of animals in zoos and the level of care for collections in museums, for instance. We assume that charity i maximizes its net reveneues R i -donations minus costs -to be used toward the cause. If R i ≤ 0, the charity is unable to contribute to the cause.
On the supply side of the charitable market, there is a continuum of donors of mass M. Each donor picks a charity to support the cause. Donors are otherwise identical and come in two types: informed and uninformed. Informed donors, whose measure is I, ascertain the quality of charities prior to giving while uninformed donors, whose measure is U = M − I, give randomly to one. Each donor has a unit wealth and possesses Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) preferences: 7
where x i ≥ 0 denotes private consumption and g i ≥ 0 denotes gift to the charity whose quality is q. The donor is assumed to receive no utility from giving if the charity of her choice fails to support the cause, that is if R i ≤ 0. 8 We focus on symmetric (Nash) equilibrium with pure entry decisions.
Discussion
Our model is designed to highlight the role of donor information as the unique source of the quality heterogeneity. We therefore assume all charities and donors ex ante identical except for donor information, which is endogenized in Section 4. As is standard in the literature, we assume "warm-glow" charities that care only about their own provision of the public good. This is not critical, however. As long as charities care more about their own provision so that there is rivalry, the qualitative results will hold. From (1), it is evident that we also assume "warm-glow" givers (Andreoni 1990 ). This is a reasonable description of charitable behavior for a continuum of donors. As argued by Glazer and Konrad (1996) , suppose Γ is the total provision of the public good by active charities in the market. Let the public good enter the utility in an additively separable way:
. Since, with a continuum of donors, dΓ/dg i = 0, such an altruistic motive has no effect on donor behavior. 9 It is worth observing further that in the base model, charities value the level but not the quality of their provision. The latter is demanded by donors. This helps isolate the source of quality provision, but in Section 5, we show that our results are robust to a quality-adjusted provision by charities. 7 This way of modeling preference for quality mirrors those of Vesterlund (2003) and Andreoni (2006) . The CES form is assumed for exposition as the analysis readily generalizes to: u(x i , g i ; q) = t(x i ) + qw(g i ) where both t and w are strictly increasing and strictly concave. 8 Perhaps, the list of charities that support the cause such as open zoos, open museums and active homeless shelters is publicized. 9 The fact that donations are driven purely by the warm-glow motive also obtains in a large finite economy 
Equilibrium characterization
Maximizing utility in (1) subject to budget constraint, x i + g i = 1, donor i's optimal gift is found to be
where r = 1 1−ρ ∈ (1, ∞) is the elasticity of substitution between private consumption and donation. Refer to Figure 1 . It is readily verified that (a) g(0) = g (0) = 0; (b) g (q) > 0 for q > 0, and (c) g (q) > 0 for q < q c and g (q) < 0 for q > q c , where q c = r−1 r+1 1 r . That is, giving is increasing in quality -at an increasing rate for its low levels and at a decreasing rate for its high levels.
Since an informed donor learns the entire quality distribution of charities, he optimally gives to the highest ranked, denoted by q max . An uninformed donor, on the other hand, can only conjecture the quality of his selected charity, denoted by q U . Using (2), informed and uninformed gifts can be respectively written:
Note that the behavior of informed donors turns the quality competition into an all-pay auction -e.g., Che and Gale (2003) and Siegel (2010) . It is, therefore, unsurprising that there will generically be no pure strategy equilibrium in quality choice. Before stating it formally, we develop some intuition behind equilibrium characterization.
Suppose that entry cost, k, is sufficiently small so that at least two charities participate in the market in equilibrium, n * ≥ 2. 10 If charity i sets quality q and ranks the highest, then it captures all informed donations as well as an equal share of the uninformed, resulting in net revenues:
If charity i ranks lower, it loses informed donations but continues to receive the uninformed, generating net revenues:
Clearly, charity i can always adopt a "scam" strategy: enter the market but choose zero quality. 11 Since g(0) = 0, such a strategy can only target the uninformed and guarantee a payoff: U n * g(q * U ) − k. Ignoring integer problems, this payoff will be driven to zero under free entry:
Substituting for (6), (4) and (5) reduce to:
From (6) and (7), we see distinct roles for the two donor types in the charitable market:
the uninformed entice charity entry while the informed engender competition in quality.
It is, however, possible that the total informed donation is too small to recover the cost of quality -i.e., R * win (q) ≤ 0 for all q -in which case no incentive to enter the market exists. To rule out such trivial cases, suppose that R * win (q) > 0 for some q > 0. From (7) , this implies that only the winning charity will supply the public good and that as with the informed, uninformed donors will also aim for the highest quality, whom they correctly select with probability 1 n * . The expected quality by the uninformed is therefore 10 A competitive charitable market is the case of most interest for us both because it is suggested by evidence and because, as we will see in the next section, a market with a single charity is not sustainable in equilibrium under endogenous information. 11 We distinguish between a charity scam and failed fundraising. Although the donor receives no utility from giving in either case, in the latter, the charity invests in quality but ends up raising insufficient funds to cover its costs. This distinction is also consistent with the popular view; see ¡http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/features/feature-0011-charity-scams¿.
where E[.] denotes the expectation operator.
To complete the characterization, let F * (q) denote the equilibrium distribution that represents each fundraiser's mixing over quality choices. It is determined by setting the expected net revenues to the free-entry payoff, 0:
where (F * ) n * −1 (q) is the probability that q is the highest quality. Simplifying (8), we obtain
Note that F * (0) > 0 (since r > 1), which suggests that there is a mass point at q = 0.
Propositions 1 and 2 collect and formalize these observations.
Proposition 1
Suppose that there is a symmetric equilibrium in which n * ≥ 2. Then, in equilibrium, (a) informed and uninformed gifts are respectively:
(b) n * is uniquely determined by:
(c) Each charity continuously mixes over q ∈ [q L , q H ] according to (9) and has a mass point at
Parts (a) and (b) are as explained above. In particular, indiscrimate giving by the uninformed attracts entry until it is exhausted. This means that each charity relies on informed donations for a positive net revenue. Refer to Figure 2 . For a sufficiently low quality q ∈ (0, q), informed donations fall below the cost. 12 As such, the charity will either choose zero quality and grab some uninformed donations or choose a high enough quality, q ≥ q, and have a chance to receive informed donations, too. This tradeoff generates the mass point at zero. Standard all-pay auction arguments indicate that another (interior) 12 Note that R * win (0) = g (0) − 1 = −1. as well as why the upper bound q H must obtain at the highest break-even quality. The equilibrium distribution F * (q) is as derived in (9) . Intuitively, the equilibrium distribution balances the probability of winning informed donations to the cost-to-donation ratio.
Since, by definition, the distribution is strictly increasing in the quality level, so is the ratio. In this sense, the cost-to-donation ratio, often utilized by leading watchdogs such as Charity Navigator and CharityWatch, appears an unreliable measure for ranking charities (Steinberg, 1991; Gneezy et al. 2014 ). 13 We emphasize that equilibrium heterogeneity in quality in our model is based solely on donor information -not on preference or income heterogeneity -which in turn creates demand for information; see Section 4.
Proposition 1 characterizes equilibrium but does not prove its existence. Armed with F * (q), (11) implies that in equilibrium, n * ≥ 2 if and only if k ≤ M−I n * g(
n * ). The righthand side of this inequality -the share of uninformed gifts -is decreasing in n * and single-peaked in I, leading us to Proposition 2.
and suppose M > I c ≡ r(r − 1) 1 r −1 . Then, for every k < k L , there are two cutoffs I L < I H such that there is a unique symmetric equilibrium with n * ≥ 2 if and only if I L ≤ I ≤ I H , where I c < I L and I H < M.
Proposition 2 indicates that the amount of informed giving cannot be too high or too low to sustain a competitive charitable market. Given the all-pay nature of quality choice, significant uninformed giving is needed to accommodate costly entry while at the same time, significant informed giving is also needed to encourage the costly provision of quality. The condition M > I c merely ensures that a positive net revenue is feasible for at least the winning charity so trivial cases of no provision are avoided; formally, R * win (q) > 0 for some q > 0 whenever I > I c . In fact, I must sufficiently exceed the break-even level I c so that at least two charities participate in the market. The uniqueness of equilibrium follows because the uninformed gift, g(
, is decreasing in the number of fundraisers, n, resulting in a unique n * for a given entry cost k. The source of such diminished generosity by the uninformed is a negative competition effect on quality, which we elaborate on in the next proposition. Before stating it, however, it is useful to record donors' expected payoffs.
Note from (1) that a donor's indirect utility conditional on charity quality q is:
which, from (2), reduces to:
where v (q) > 0 and v (q) > 0. The equilibrium expected payoffs for informed and uninformed donors are therefore v *
Proposition 3 Suppose that I L < I < I H . Then, in equilibrium, as the entry cost k drops (a) the number of charities n * increases and goes to infinity as k → 0;
(b) the expected quality of service, E[ q * max ], decreases and converges to Not surprisingly, as entry becomes less costly, more charities enter the market. The intensified competition, however, stochastically lowers the quality of service (i.e., the maximum quality) and thus the expected donor welfare. This is easily seen by inspecting the quality distribution in (9) . Note that F * (q) is increasing in n * : charities are less willing to invest in quality in a competition (for the informed donors) that they are more likely to lose. While there is also a positive scale effect associated with the number of charities, the negative effect of competition dominates since the distribution for the maximum quality (F * ) n * (q) is also increasing in n * . 14 In the most competitive market, the two effects balance each other out: (F * ) n * (q) → q Ig(q) as n * → ∞, leaving the expected quality of service strictly positive in the limit economy. Part (c) obtains because all donors care about the quality of service, as implied by (13) . Indeed, it is clear from part (a) of Proposition 1 that both informed and uninformed donors turn less generous in a more competitive market, with the uninformed gift approaching zero, as one would expect.
An important corollary to Propositions 1-3 is that the equilibrium probability that all charities are scammers remains nonnegligible even in the most competitive market. Formally,
where I c ≡ r(r − 1) 1 r −1 as defined in Proposition 2. 15 Building on the insight from Proposition 3, we now explore the impact of informed giving on market entry and donor welfare, both of which will be instrumental in endogenizing information in the next section. 14 F n * (q) would obviously be decreasing in n * if F(q) were exogenous. 15 As is evident from (9), this limit probability is positive if and only if there is a mass point at zero or F * (0) > 0, which depends on the cost of quality and donor preferences. We have assumed a linear cost but our point is more general. If the cost of quality is c(q), a mass point at zero quality exists if and only if c(0)
For instance, if c(q) = q θ , θ > 0, this condition reduces to θ ≤ r.
Note from Proposition 1 that fixing the number of charities, an increase in informed giving, I, raises the expected quality of service, both because it extends the quality competition -i.e., ∂q H /∂I > 0 -and because it makes higher quality levels more likely to be chosen -i.e., ∂[1 − F * (q)]/∂I > 0. Expecting a better service by the winning charity, the uninformed become more generous, which encourages further entry. Countervailing this incentive for entry, and the reason behind the non-monotonicity in part (a), is the fact that given the population size, more of informed giving means less of the uninformed, which discourages entry. This non-monotonicity is illustrated in Figure 3 . To understand part (b), notice that the increased informed giving can adversely affect the expected quality of service only if it entices more charities into the market. This negative competition effect must, however, be limited in equilibrium: otherwise, by Proposition 1(b), lower expected quality of service along with more charities would depress uninformed giving and lead to fewer charities in equilibrium, yielding a contradiction. The same logic reveals that the expected quality of service by the uninformed,
n * , is also increasing in I. From (13) , this implies that the uninformed donor benefits from informed giving. As stated in part (c), the informed donor also benefits from informed giving by others because the indirect utility in (12) is increasing and convex in quality.
Propositions 2 and 4 make clear the importance of donor information in the charitable market. We have, however, taken informed and uninformed giving as exogenous so far. A natural question then is: does it pay to be informed? We address this question next.
Endogenous information
Suppose that at the outset no donor is informed but each can get informed by paying a fixed (utility) cost c > 0. This cost reflects time and energy spent in processing charities' projects and/or their watchdog ratings. The value of being informed is simply the difference between the expected informed and uninformed payoffs recorded in (13) . Formally, given the mass of informed donors, I, the value of being informed for a representative donor is
where n * = n * (I).
Since v(q) is convex, ∆(I) ≥ 0. The donor pays for information if and only if ∆(I) ≥ c. Therefore, under endogenous information, a triplet (I * , n * * , F * * ) constitutes a (Nash) equilibrium if:
• no charity has an incentive to enter or exit -i.e., n * * = n * (I * ),
• no active charity has an incentive to deviate from symmetric mixing F * * = F * | I=I * , and • no uninformed donor has an incentive to be informed and no informed donor has an incentive to remain uninformed; 16 in particular, the following must hold in equilibrium:
Our first observation is that regardless of the information cost, there always exists a degenerate equilibrium in which the market fails.
Lemma 1 A degenerate equilibrium in which (I * , n * * ) = (0, 0) always exists.
Proof. Given I * = 0, charity i in the market would receive payoff: R i = M n * * g * * U − q i − k, which is maximized at q i = 0. But then no uninformed donor would make a positive contribution -i.e., g * * U = 0, implying R i = −k < 0 and in turn n * * = 0. Conversely, given n * * = 0, staying uninformed is clearly a best response for each donor -i.e., I * = 0. Lemma 1 follows because as noted above, charities provide quality to win informed donors. In the absence of the latter, uninformed donors grow pessimistic about quality and are unwilling to contribute, which in turn deters entry.
An important corollary to Lemma 1 is that for the charitable market to exist, there must be some informed giving in equilibrium, I * > 0. In fact, as indicated in Proposition 2, informed giving must be significant, though not universal, to both accommodate entry 16 Here we implicitly assume a pure information acquisition decision but given a continuum of donors, this is strategically equivalent to having each mix and acquire information with probability I * M . and justify the cost of quality. Lemma 2 adds that for informed giving, at least two charities must be active.
Lemma 2
If I * > 0, then n * * ≥ 2 and I L ≤ I * ≤ I H .
Proof. Suppose that I * > 0. Then n * * ≥ 1 and ∆(I * ) ≥ c by Lemma 1 and (15), respectively. If n * * = 1, the sole charity would set q S > 0 that uniquely maximizes
This implies that q * * max = q * * U and that ∆(I * ) = 0 from (14) -a contradiction. Hence, n * * ≥ 2.
Intuitively, for donors to be interested in informed giving, there must be quality uncertainty. But this can only arise under competition; otherwise, having a single-peaked net revenue (see Figure 2 ), a single charity would choose a perfectly predictable quality, leading all donors to stay uninformed instead. 17 Lemma 2 implies that in a nondegenerate equilibrium, I * ∈ (0, M) and therefore solves
In order to determine when there is a solution to (16) 
These extreme values of information are well-defined because ∆(I) is continuous. It is readily verified that 0 < ∆ min < ∆ max < ∞. From here, Proposition 5 is immediate.
Proposition 5 A nondegenerate equilibrium exists if and only if the information cost is moderate:
Intuitively, if the information cost were too high, then donors would remain uninformed and without the informed, they would expect minimal quality of service and not
give. If, on the other hand, the information cost were too low, charities would expect a much intense quality competition and with little uninformed giving, they would be unable to recoup their entry costs (however small they are). Proposition 5 thus suggests a limit to the benefits of the freely available charity ratings. To understand this point further, we next study the effect of the information cost on informed giving and social welfare.
Given I, we define social welfare to be the sum of expected donor payoffs:
Since, in equilibrium, informed donors ignore their positive externality on others, the following inefficiency is observed.
Lemma 3
In equilibrium, too few donors get informed.
Proof. Differentiating (18) and evaluating at equilibrium, we have W (I * ) = I * v * (16) and Proposition 4(c). In equilibrium, using ∆(I * ) = c from (16), (18) reduces to:
Informed giving improves equilibrium welfare to the extent that it improves the uninformed payoff, v * U (I). Any additional benefit is outweighed by its cost. Recall from Proposition 4(c) that the uninformed payoff is increasing in I. (19) therefore implies that a higher information cost will lower welfare if and only if it discourages informed giving. The latter depends criticially on whether ∆ (I * ) > 0 or ∆ (I * ) ≤ 0 -i.e., whether donors' decisions to become informed are strategic complements or strategic substitutes. Under reasonable conditions, information acquisition decisions are strategic complements, leading us to: Proposition 6 Suppose that k is sufficiently small or that r is sufficiently close to 1. Then, there exists some ∆ ∈ (∆ min , ∆ max ) such that for ∆ min ≤ c < ∆, there is a unique nondegenerate equilibrium. Moreover, the mass of informed donors, I * , and social welfare, W(I * ), are both increasing in the information cost, c. Proposition 6 says that a higher information cost may actually encourage informed giving and raise total donor welfare in turn! Suppose that the setup cost k is negligible.
Then we know from Proposition 3 that a large number of charities enter the market, which completely discourages uninformed giving. Formally, for k ≈ 0, we have v * U (I) ≈ 1 and thus ∆(I) ≈ v * I (I) − 1, which increases with I and indicates that information acquisition decisions are strategic complements. From (16) , the mass of informed donors is found to be I * ≈ v * −1
which is clearly increasing in c.
The same comparative static also holds for a nonnegligible setup cost if donor preferences are (approximately) Cobb-Douglas, r ≈ 1. The intuition is similar but slightly more involved in this case due to the fact that uninformed giving is significant. Notice that for r ≈ 1, the indirect utility in (12) becomes v(q) ≈ 1 + q and reduces the value of information to:
Clearly, the value of information is increasing in both the expected quality of service,
, and the number of fundraisers, n * , because, unlike informed donors, the uninformed is able to pick the best fundraiser with probability 1 n * . Under exogenous information, we know from Proposition 4 that E[ q * max ] is increasing in the size of informed donors, I. We also know that n * = n * (I) is single-peaked; so there is a threshold I > I L such that for I ∈ (I L , I), n * (I) is also increasing in I, implying a higher value of information in this region, d∆(I)/dI > 0. From (16) , it follows that I * rises with c for some intermediate cost levels, as stated in Proposition 6.
This formal intuition is also illustrated in Figure 3 suggest that strategic complementarity of information acquisition decisions will be pronounced even more for higher r values. Intuitively, as implied by (2), under a greater substitutibility between private consumption and giving, donors grow more generous so long as the charity quality is sufficiently high -i.e., q > 1. This additional giving compensates for the diminished uninformed giving and extends the region in which charity entry, and therefore the value of information, rises with the size of the informed. Proposition 6 is important because, as alluded to in the Introduction, the sheer number of charities suggests little entry cost into the market for donations. Indeed, after natural disasters and national tragedies, donors are often warned of charity scams, raising money for victims. 18 In such cases, Proposition 6 predicts that information cost must be significant -not negligible -to promote informed giving and raise total donor welfare in turn.
Cost uncertainty and equilibrium robustness.
In order to explain heterogeneity in donor information endogenously, we have assumed a homogenous information cost c. 
Note that ∆ (I * ) > 0 is necessary but not sufficient for the uniqueness. For the latter, we must have ∆ (I * ) > G (.)/M. In words, under heterogenous costs, a nondegenerate equi-librium is unique if information acquisition decisions are strongly strategic complements.
Suppose that (21) holds. Differentiating (20) with respect to α, we find
Hence, if, as in Proposition 6, the nondegenerate equilibrium is unique, a stochastic increase in the information cost means more informed giving. To understand its impact on social welfare, we write expected sum of donor payoffs:
Integrating by parts yields
As a result, if, as in Proposition 6, the nondegenerate equilibrium is unique, a stochastic increase in the information cost also means a higher social welfare.
An extension: quality-adjusted provision
Up to now, we have assumed that charities aim to maximize the amount of public service, R i , and provide quality only to satisfy donors' demand for it. Conceivably, charities may also have an intrinsic preference for quality. For instance, a charity may value not only how many homeless it shelters but also about how well it shelters them. Here we show that our results carry over. Suppose that charity i maximizes the following quality-adjusted provision:
where φ (q) > 0 and φ(0) > 0. The latter rules out φ(0) = 0 to ensure that as in the base model, the charity cannot avoid entry cost by choosing q = 0. As before, if the collected funds turn out insufficient to cover the cost, then no service can be provided, irrespective of quality. To intuitively see the equivalence of equilibrium with the base model, we recall the previous line of argument. Note that if charity i sets quality q and ranks the highest among n * ≥ 2, then it receives net revenues: R * win (q) = φ(q)R * win (q). If it ranks lower, it receives net revenues: R * lose (q) = φ(q)R * lose (q). The indifference equation to determine the equilibrium quality distribution F * therefore becomes
which, canceling out φ(q) > 0 from the left-hand side, reduces to (8) . Moreover, since φ(0) > 0, it is clear that the free entry condition in (6) and thus (7) remain intact. Together, (23) reveals that F * (q) is exactly as found in Proposition 1. Given this, it is immediate that the rest of the analysis, including endogenous information, continues to hold under this generalization.
Conclusion
Drawing upon the all-pay auction literature, especially Varian (1980) and Che and Gale (2003) , this paper has offered a novel model of charity competition in which imperfect donor information alone can explain the quality heterogeneity across similar charities. We show that both significant uninformed and significant informed giving is necessary for the existence of the charitable market: the former entices costly entry whereas the latter induces quality provision by charities. As such, the information cost for donors cannot be too high or too low in this market. We also show that as the entry cost falls, more charities fundraise but the increased competition decreases the expected quality of the charitable service and donor welfare.
Our findings indicate that the ease of entry into the charitable market, as suggested by the IRS approval rate (see Footnote 1), may adversely affect the quality of charitable service. Although our model is too stylized to determine the socially optimal number of charities, it does starkly imply that only two charities may generate enough quality competition for each charitable cause. 19
A Appendix
Lemma A1 Let y 1 ,...,y n be nonnegative iid random variables, with cdf F and pdf f . 
Note that Finally, since k( n k ) = n( n−1 k−1 ), we have (c)
Proof. We can re-write eq. (7) as R win (q) = q 1+q r Ω(q) where Ω(q) = q r−1 I − (1 + q r ). We define q H to be the largest root that solves R win (q) = 0. Note that Ω(q) is maximized for q * = r−1 r I with Ω * = Ω( r−1 r I) = (r−1) r−1 r r I r − 1. For I < I c , Ω * (q) < 0 for all q. Therefore, q H = 0 for I < I c . For I ≥ I c , Ω(q) ≥ 0 for some q > 0. Therefore, q H > 0 and solves Ω(q H ) = 0. Note that lim I→I c q * = (r − 1) 1 r = q L and lim I→I c Ω(q * ) = 0, which implies that lim I→I c Ω(q) < 0 for all q = q L . Therefore, by the definition of q H , lim I→I c q H = q L .
To prove part (b), note from eq. (7) that q H =
.
To prove part (c), we first integrate by parts E[q max |n, I] from Lemma A1:
Differentiating with respect to I,
> 0 (because ∂F n (q)/∂I < 0).
Finally, for part (d),
< 0 follows from ∂F n (q) ∂n > 0. The limit of E[ q max ] obtains by observing that F n (q) → q Ig(q) as n → ∞.
Proof of Proposition 1. We begin with part (c). Suppose that n ≥ 2. As in standard all-pay auctions, no symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies exists in quality competition:
given others' quality choices, fundraiser i would have a strict incentive to slightly increase his and win all of informed donations. In equilibrium, let each fundraiser mix according to F(q) and S be its support. Clearly, due to free entry, the (common) expected payoff across quality choices in S is π = 0. Moreover, a standard argument from all-pay auctions reveals that F(q) cannot admit a mass point at q > 0; otherwise, fundraiser i could shift weight to q + ε and discretely increase his probability of winning informed donations while raising cost only by ε. From (4) and (5), the expected payoff of a fundraiser thus satisfies
Note that since a fundraiser could enter the market and choose q = 0, it must be that
Together with (A-4), (A-3) implies that F(q) > 0 for all q ∈ S + . Then q = 0 must be in S and have a probability mass. In particular, letting q L < q H be the lower and upper bounds of S + , we have F(0) = F(q L ), as stated in part (c).
Setting q = 0 in (A-3), (A-4) reduces to:
as stated in part (b). Using (A-5), (A-3) reduces to:
from which the c.d.f. in part (c) obtains. Substituting for (2) and differentiating, we find the p.d.f.:
The continuous mixing over S + requires that F (q) > 0 in its interior, which in turn requires that q L ≥ (r − 1) 1 r . Suppose that q L > (r − 1) 1 r . Then fundraiser i's expected payoff from a deviation to q ∈ (0, q L ) is
Simple algebra shows
This means that there exists some q ∈ (0, q L ) such that π d i (q, q L ) > π d i (q L , q L ) = 0, contradicting q L being in S + . Thus q L = (r − 1) 1 r . To complete the proof of part (a), note that R lose (q) = −q by using (A-5). Therefore, only the highest quality fundraiser will provide charitable service. The informed donor ascertains the winner before giving while the uninformed donor picks him with probability 1 n . This explains their optimal gifts in part (a).
To complete the proof of part (b), we substitute from (10) Therefore, a symmetric equilibrium with n ≥ 2 requires h(2; .) ≥ 0. Then, by (A-7) there is a unique n that solves h(n; .) = 0, proving part (b). Since n uniquely pins down F(q) and the gifts, there is also a unique symmetric equilibrium. 
Let Λ(n, I) = (M − I)r ∂q U ∂I and Υ(n, I) = q U (1 + q r U ) and Φ(n, I) = Λ(n, I) − Υ(n, I). Then, ∂h(n;I,r) ∂I sign = Φ(I, n) for I > I c since q U > 0 for I > I c . Given eq. (A-2) and ∂F n (q) 
where differentiating eq. (A-9) yilds 
< 0. This, however, implies that ∂ 2 Φ(n,I ) 
Note that 
where v(q) is defined by eq. (12). Integrating by parts, we obtain:
where is single-picked in I, which implies that n * is single-picked in I.
To prove part (b), note that
For ∂n * ∂I > 0, we can re-write the equilibrium entry condition given by eq. (11) as
Differentiating both sides with respect to I, results in
Note that g (q) > 0 and ∂n * ∂I > 0 imply that d dI
To prove part c), consider first the uninformed donor. By eq. (13) v U is increasing in
Next we consider the informed donor. By eq. (A-14),
For ∂n * ∂I > 0, lim q→0 dF n * (q) dI = ∞ and dF n * (q H ) dI = − n * (n * −1)I < 0. Moreover, (n * −1)n * I − ln 1+q r q r−1 I ∂n * ∂I is increasing in q. Therefore, by continuity, there existsq(I) such that dF n * (q) dI > 0 for q <q(I) and dF n * (q) dI < 0 for q >q(I).
Consider arbitrary I and I such that I > I and n * (I ) > n * (I ). Then by (A-14)
v * 
We want to show that v *
where we used v(q L ) = ξ(q L ). Note that the strict convexing of v(q) and the linearly of ξ(q) implies that v (q) < ξ (q) for q <q. Moverover, v(q L ) = ξ(q L ) and v (q) < ξ (q)
imply that v(0) − ξ(0) > 0. Then, we can write [v(q) − ξ(q)] dF n * (q|I ) > 0 where the inequality follows from the fact that v (q) − ξ (q) > 0 for q >q(< q H ).
The term [v(0) − ξ(0)][F n * (q L |I ) − F n * (q L |I )] > 0 since [v(0) − ξ(0)] > 0 and F n * (q L |I ) − F n * (q L |I ) > 0. Finally, the term − q H q L (v (q) − ξ (q)) [F n * (q|I ) − F n * (q|I )]dq > 0 since 1) for q <q, v (q) < ξ (q) and F n * (q|I ) > F n * (q|I ); 2) for q >q, v (q) > ξ (q) and F n * (q|I ) < F n * (q|I ). Since ∂F n * (q) ∂n > 0 for q < q H , ∂∆ 1 (I) ∂n > 0. By Proposition 4, n * (I) is single-picked with ∂n * (I) ∂I > 0 for some I < I < I H . Therefore, by the continuity of ∆ 1 (I), there exists I such that ∆ 1 (I) is strictly increasing in I for I ≤ I. Suppose instead that I < I H . Let I 1 = arg min I∈( I,I H ) ∆ 1 (I). We want to show that ∆ 1 ( I 1 ) = ∆ 1 > ∆ min , implying the uniqueness of the non-degenerate equilibrium for c ∈ [∆ min , ∆ 1 ). Recall that n * (I L ) = n * (I H ) = 2 (see proof of Proposition 2) and n * is single picked (Proposition 4) reaching a maximum at I < I 1 . Therefore, there exists I ∈ [I L , I ) such that n * (I) = n * ( I 1 ). However, since ∂∆ 1 (I)
Therefore, for c ∈ [∆ min , ∆ 1 ), the non-degenerate equilibrium is unique. By the continuity of ∆(I) and 
